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3 Military Intervention and Democracy 
 
‘America is a nation with a mission … Our aim is a democratic peace – a peace 
founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman … This great re-
public will lead the cause of freedom. We will finish the historic work of democ-
racy in Afghanistan and Iraq, so those nations can light the way for others, and 
help transform a troubled part of the world’. Thus spoke George W. Bush in his 
State of the Union Address on 20 January 2004 (Bush, 2004) in what has be-
come rather typical rhetoric from key decisionmakers in the current US admini-
stration. In this paper we look at how the theoretical and empirical work on the 
democratic peace can be absorbed into a policy of liberal imperialism. We exam-
ine the empirical foundations of this policy, the prospects of its success, its 
limitations, and its possible demise. 
 
The Democratic Peace 
 
Democracies rarely if ever fight each other. This is the essence of the democratic 
peace, confirmed in a number of studies (Doyle, 1986; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; 
Russett, 1993; Russett & Oneal, 2001). Raknerud & Hegre (1997) estimate that 
dyads of two democracies had a 57% lower probability than mixed dyads of on-
set of interstate war in the 1840–1992 period, and 35% lower probability than 
non-democratic dyads. The estimate is conservative since the analysis includes 
several dubious cases of wars between democracies such as the wars between 
Finland and the Allied powers. While Rummel (1983) sees the dyadic democ-
ratic peace (‘the joint freedom proposition’) as being without significant excep-
tions, as does Ray (1995), and Levy (1989: 88) has labeled it ‘as close as 
anything we have to an empirical law in world politics’, others limit themselves 
to viewing it merely as very strong (Weede, 1992: 382) and robust to the rele-
vant control variables (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 313). The argument that it was 
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an artifact of the bipolar structure of the Cold War (Faber & Gowa, 1995) begs 
the crucial issue of why all the democracies were on one side in that worldwide 
conflict, and rapidly loses its force as the post-Cold War world piles up new 
dyad-years without new evidence of inter-democratic wars. The theoretical justi-
fications for the dyadic democratic peace remain more contested. The main con-
tenders – the normative and the structural explanations – still have their 
spokespersons, while Russett & Oneal (2001: 53f.) now argue that the two 
should not be seen as contradictory. Mansfield & Snyder (1995, 2002a) have 
argued that democratization promotes armed interstate conflict but others 
(Thompson & Tucker, 1997; Ward & Gleditsch 1998) hold that political instabil-
ity is the main culprit, that failed or reversed democratization is particularly 
dangerous, and that the a higher level of dyadic democracy will soon outweigh 
the unsettling effect of political change. Mansfield & Snyder (2002b) also find 
that dyads where either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition 
are particularly prone to violence. In a theoretical model James & Mitchell 
(1995) allow democratic hegemons to coerce weaker democracies that are trying 
to break out of structural dependency, but there is no systematic empirical evi-
dence for this. As Forsythe (1992) concedes in discussing the frequently cited 
examples of US covert action against Cuba, Nicaragua, and others, the target 
states were hardly model democracies and the level of violence was insufficient 
to record these episodes as armed conflict even by the Uppsala criteria.4 
While there is compelling evidence for the dyadic democratic peace, and 
the opposition voices are receding, the nation-level relationship remains more 
controversial. There is no evidence that democracies participate in war less 
than other regime types (Chan, 1984). Distinguishing between initiators and 
defenders does not show democracies to be more peaceful either (Small & 
Singer, 1976), although the war initiation variable is so questionable that this 
exercise is of limited value (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997: 295–297).5 Rummel (1983) 
has nevertheless consistently argued for a monadic democratic peace (the ‘free-
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dom proposition’). His original empirical evidence showing democracies to fight 
less overall was based on data for a very short time-frame. But his later argu-
ment is based on the smaller losses suffered by democratic powers in wartime. 
Some of the participants on the democratic side of the major wars are very pe-
ripheral actors that join in for political solidarity more than anything. They 
hardly suffer any casualties, but they drive the rate of democratic war participa-
tion up. However, the lower losses of democracies is also compatible with the 
notion put forward by Galtung (1996) that democracies are particularly self-
righteous and belligerent, and the fact that democracies tend to win the wars 
they participate in (Lake, 1992; Reiter & Stam, 2002). However, Rummel’s ar-
gument about peripheral allies shows an important lead. Democracies are 
much better at building large coalitions once a war has broken out. These coali-
tions are frequently with other democracies, but democracies also ally with au-
tocracies – the most glaring example is probably the wartime alliance between 
Stalin and the Western democracies, forged after Hitler’s June 1941 attack on 
the Soviet Union broke up the Hitler-Stalin pact. In all the large multilateral 
wars, the democracies were part of the larger coalition. In World War I it con-
tained 73% of the participants (11 out of 15 countries), in World War II 75%, in 
the Korean War 82%, and in the Vietnam War 78%. Serbia (1999), Afghanistan 
(2001), and Iraq (1991 and again in 2003) fought alone against large coalitions 
built by the major Western powers.6 Most of the participants on the democratic 
side, including many of the democracies, joined the war after conflict had bro-
ken out. The best case for arguing that democracies are more peaceful overall is 
that they participate less frequently in the outbreak of new armed conflict. In all 
but one of the eight wars mentioned above, the violence had been initiated by 
two non-democratic actors, while the democracies joined later. The one excep-
tion is the Iraq War of 2003, to which we return later.7 
As the number of democracies increases, the crucial question is what hap-
pens at the system level. Generalizing from the dyadic level, most writers (like 
Singer & Wildavsky, 1993) have assumed that the systemic relationship could 
be deduced from the dyadic: the more democracy in the world, the more peace. 
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A few have generalized from the monadic level: since democracies participate in 
war as much as other states, more democracy in the world makes no difference 
at the system level (Small & Singer, 1976). It is perfectly possible for the dyadic 
relationship to hold at the same time as the monadic non-relationship; it simply 
implies that politically mixed dyads are the most hazardous. But the generaliza-
tions from the dyadic level and the monadic level cannot both be true, since 
they lead to very different predictions. Combining the insights at the dyadic 
level and the monadic level, Gleditsch & Hegre (1997: 297–304) conclude that if 
the probability of war in the three types of democratic/authoritarian dyads (DD, 
DA, and AA) were independent of time and space, a parabolic relationship 
would be found at the system level: In a world with few democracies, adding 
another democracy would increase the probability of war overall, while in a 
world of many democracies increasing democratization would bring more peace. 
The systemic argument is hard to test empirically. Gleditsch & Hegre (1997: 
304–307) adduce in support of their argument that the incidence of war at the 
system level (measured as the percentage of country-years at war) roughly fol-
lows an inverted U-shaped curve, while the share of countries with democratic 
government has increased over the same period, although not linearly. How-
ever, an analysis by Mitchell, Gates & Hegre (1999: 788) concluded that the 
positive systemic relationship between democracy and peace seemed to be 
monotonic rather than curvilinear. Among the many reasons why the Gleditsch 
& Hegre (1997) model may not hold is that democracies tend to cluster and that 
the probability of conflict with one’s immediate neighbors is likely to be more 
important that the probability of conflict with distant states (Gleditsch & Ward, 
2000; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2004). Moreover, the increasing acceptance of 
democracy as an international norm may well have influenced the probability of 
conflict in the three regime type combinations. Since most wars are between 
neighbors (or at least regional) the question whether the systemic relationship 
between democracy and peace is monotonic or curvilinear is not important for 
those parts of the world where democracy is the dominant form of government. 
However, it is crucial for regions at a low level of democracy, another issue to 
which we shall return. 
So far we have only discussed the effect of democracy on interstate peace. 
The numerically dominant form of conflict today is intrastate war, or civil war 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005; Marshall & Gurr, 2005). 







the probability of civil war (Muller & Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001). This rela-
tionship can be deduced from the theoretical notion that war is a function of 
identity formation of the competing groups, the motivation to fight over an issue, 
and the opportunity to fight. Variants of this scheme are found in the writings of 
Gurr (1970) on political violence, Collier & Hoeffler (2004)8 and Ellingsen 
(2000)9 on civil war and Most & Starr (1989) on interstate war10. If we assume 
that increased democracy provides improved opportunity for rebels to organize, 
while the lack of democracy provides a motive for rebellion against the auto-
cratic leadership, the combined effect of opportunity and motivation can be 
written as d(1-d), where d is the degree of democracy, i.e. a parabolic relation-
ship. The inverted U-curve has been confirmed in several studies (e.g. de Soysa, 
2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Hegre (2003) and Collier et al. (2003) argue that 
the relationship between democracy and civil war may be conditioned by eco-
nomic development, and that at low levels of economic development increased 
democracy may even yield more conflict. There are relatively few poor democra-
cies, so we regard the jury as still being out on this hypothesis. But if it is cor-
rect, it has implications for attempts to force democracy from the outside. 
Finally, one-sided violence (the killing of unorganized people)11 is not in-
cluded in the Correlates of War data and is only available for the period after 
the Cold War in the Uppsala Conflict data Eck & Hultman, 2007; Mack, 2005). 
But such conflict is closely related to civil war in at least two ways: First, it fre-
quently occurs in the same countries that are affected by civil war, for instance 
in order to disarm a minority group before it has a chance to rebel or after it 
has been defeated in battle. Second, one-sided violence seems to be associated 
with many of the same factors as internal violence. Rummel (1994) holds that 
the more authoritarian a country, the greater the probability of democide, while 
Fein (1995) argues that there is ‘more murder in the middle’, i.e. a pattern akin 
to the inverted U-curve posited for civil war. One could imagine that a stable 
autocracy might avoid politicide as well as civil war since the opposition is un-
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able to organize. However, politicide might act as a powerful deterrent to organi-
zation and thus to civil war in the future. Krain (1997) holds that genocide oc-
curs most frequently in states undergoing political change. Harff (2003: 70) 
finds that the risk of genocide and politicide is highest under autocratic re-
gimes, while international economic interdependency reduces the likelihood 
that regime instability and internal war will lead to mass murder. This issue 
has not yet been the subject of as much systematic research as civil war, but 
countries with a high level of democracy are in any case likely to minimize in-
ternal violence, whether the one-sided kind or the civil war variety. Finally, po-
litical change has frequently been found to be associated with internal violence. 
Hegre et al. (2001) found that political change was more common among semi-
democratic countries, but that the change effect could not be substituted for 
the level effect, or vice versa. In the lower range of democracy democratization 
can be doubly hazardous, because the destabilizing effect of change is rein-
forced by moving into the more violent middle range of democracy. At the de-
mocratic end of the scale, the destabilizing effect of democratization is likely to 
be overshadowed relatively quickly by the peace-inducing effect of a high level of 
democracy. Again, this has implications for attempts at forced democratization. 
We sum up this thumbnail sketch of the literature on the democratic 
peace by concluding that as the world becomes more democratic (with more 
democracies, and particularly with more established democracies at a higher 
level of democracy), the greater the probability that further democratization will 
reduce internal and external violence, particularly after any initial destabilizing 
effect of political change has been overcome. 
Towards a Global Liberal Peace? 
Given this relatively optimistic view of the relationship between democracy and 
peace, what are the prospects for global peace through democratization? De-
mocracy has certainly advanced over time. Given a fairly strict cut-off between 
democracy and non-democracy (a democracy has 7 or higher on the combined 
scale of democracy minus autocracy; cf. Jaggers & Gurr, 1995: 479; Marshall & 
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Jaggers, 2003), more than 40% of the world’s countries with more than 50% of 
the world’s population can now be counted as democratic (Gleditsch, 2007; 
Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Countries characterized by Freedom House (2007) as 
‘free’ have nearly half (47%) of world population and 77% live in countries that 
are either free or partly free12. The share of countries with electoral democracy 
is 83%. While the Polity project and Freedom House differ in their evaluation of 
some countries, they agree that the global level of democratization has never 
been higher. The same conclusion can be drawn from the Vanhanen’s Polyarchy 
scale.13 
The movement towards greater democracy has not been linear or even 
monotonic. It can be debated whether or not Huntington (1991) is correct in de-
scribing three waves of democratization; some may discern four or even five 
waves. In any case, it seems reasonable to say that there are three waves in the 
twentieth century, the first peaking in the early 1920s and the second in the 
late 1950s. 
The notion of waves implies that there have also been democratic rever-
sals. The first was associated with the rise of the two totalitarian movements in 
Europe in the 1920s. The second was in part a product of the many failed de-
mocratizations in the Third World after independence, but also with the contin-
ued spread of Marxist, personalist, and military regimes in many areas of the 
world. Zakaria (1997) and others have pointed to the fragile nature of many of 
the new democracies in the third wave, labeling this ‘the rise of illiberal democ-
racy’. Freedom House (2007) sees the expansion of freedom as stagnating. While 
the third wave of democratization may appear to have leveled out, warnings of 
the imminent coming of the third reversal (Diamond, 1996) have so far proved 
to be premature. 
Liberals see democratization in a mutually reinforcing relationship with 
other liberal values, such as economic interdependence and international law 
and organization. All of these, independently and together, strengthen interna-
tional and domestic peace, in the liberal view (Russett & Oneal, 2001; Schnei-
der, Barbieri & Gleditsch, 2003). 
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 One reason for an optimistic view of the future of democracy is that after 
the fall of the Soviet Union there appears to be no other worldview competing 
for global attention, democracy and the market economy are ‘the only game in 
town’ in the words of Fukuyama (1989), the ball being ‘very much in the court 
of those who want to rubbish democracy to provide justification for that rejec-
tion’ (Sen, 1999: 5). While China is still an authoritarian state proclaiming the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, its economic policies are moving in a liberal di-
rection. It pursues national interest actively, but is no longer engaged in an 
ideological crusade through agents like Albania or the Khmer Rouge. ‘Asian 
values’, with an emphasis on collectivism rather than individual human and 
political rights, has lost some its appeal after the Republic of Korea has shown 
that political democracy is compatible with economic growth and continued re-
spect for the elders and Japan has shown that Asian economic growth may not 
last forever. Fundamentalist Islam is certainly in opposition to democracy, and 
Freedom House (2005) characterizes 60% of the countries with a Muslim major-
ity are ‘not free’ and only 4% as ‘free’. Unlike almost any other part of the world, 
the Muslim world has so far been left unaffected by the third wave. Yet, funda-
mentalist Islam is hardly a viable alternative for the world, the way communism 
appeared to be. It is strongly opposed by all major economic and military pow-
ers and is kept down in various ways by most countries where Muslims are in a 
minority. There is an incipient grass-roots movement against one of the liberal 
values, globalization, supported by a mixed coalition of radicals, protectionists, 
and environmentalists. But this movement has little government support and is 
not directed against democratization, although some of its opponents hold that 
this might be an indirect effect were its advocacy to succeed. 
Although democratization is by no means an irreversible process, there is 
a ratchet effect. Contrary to the view promoted in the vast literature during the 
Cold War on the dim prospects of democracy (see e.g. Revel, 1983), democracy 
turns out to be more resilient than other forms of government. Hegre et al. 
(2001: 38) show that for the period 1816–1992 democracies are less likely to 
revert into an alternative regime type (autocracy or semi-democracy). The semi-
democratic regime type is the least stable, while autocratic countries are some-
what more stable, but less than democracies. Thus, while some countries con-
tinue to move between the three regime types, fewer leave the democratic camp. 
If this pattern persists, eventually most if not all countries will end up in the 







The third wave of democratization was initially accompanied by a rising 
trend in conflict. This trend went back to the late 1950s. It seems due in large 
part to a rising number of new states, many of which fell prey to civil war. In 
fact, the probability of a given country being involved in armed conflict stayed 
roughly level for the second half of the Cold War and is now lower than at any 
time since the end of the 1950s (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 621). The incidence of 
conflict also increased during the Cold War due to a failure to end a number of 
conflicts that dragged on for decades, frequently supported by the major powers 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 77–78). The frequently hailed ‘long peace’ of the Cold 
War period (Gaddis, 1987) preserved the nuclear stalemate between the two su-
perpowers while avoiding a direct confrontation, but did not create peace in the 
Third World. On the contrary, it seems to have stimulated proxy wars in South-
ern Africa, Central America, and elsewhere. At the end of the Cold War, this 
changed drastically. A few new conflicts appeared, mainly in the two socialist 
federal states that fell apart (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), but soon a number 
of protracted Cold War-related conflicts were resolved and from 1993 the num-
ber of armed conflicts has declined (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005: 624). The 
United Nations was freed from the numbing effect of the bipolar divide, and got 
involved in an increasing number of peacekeeping missions.14 
The decline of war is not only reflected by the number of conflicts, but also 
in the number of battle-related casualties. In fact, the trend in battle-related 
casualties has been downward since World War II, while before that it had been 
pointing up. Over half the battle deaths in armed conflict since World War II are 
accounted for by five major international wars (Vietnam, Korea, Iran–Iraq, Af-
ghanistan) and one civil war (China). The spikes in the curve created by these 
major wars decline over time and constitute the major reason for the decline in 
battle deaths overall (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005). Lacina (2006) finds democracy 
robustly and negatively associated with the severity of civil war, as measured by 
battle deaths. 
Viewed at the global level, the prospects for a stable liberal peace seem 
promising. But most interstate wars are between neighbors and those interven-
tions in civil wars that are not from major powers also tend to be from 
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neighboring states. Both democracy and conflict are strongly clustered 
(Gleditsch, 2002). While some parts of the world – notably Western Europe and 
North America – make up a ‘pacific union’ (Kant, 1795) or a ‘pluralistic security 
community’ (Deutsch et al., 1957) where war has become ‘obsolescent’ (Muller, 
1989, 2003), other regions are mired in conflict. The world is divided into ‘zones 
of peace’ and ‘zones of turmoil’ (Singer & Wildavsky, 1993). Africa, the Middle 
East, and South Asia are conflict-ridden, while Europe, North America, and 
East Asia are virtually without any active armed conflict. Isolated democracies 
are more likely to fall prey to authoritarian states (Cederman & Gleditsch, 
2004). Clearly, attempts at forced democratization will have to take regional 
patterns into account. 
Democratic Interventionism? 
An early objection to the dyadic democratic peace was based on the possibility 
that the causation might be reversed: peace was causing democracy rather than 
the other way around. Thompson (1996) made this argument on the basis of 
four historical case studies, but so far this view has not gained much support 
in statistical analyses (Mousseau & Shi, 1999). It is true that war (or even the 
threat of war) tends to heighten security concerns, that this may lead to a lower 
priority for freedom of speech and other civil liberties,15 and in some cases the 
postponing of elections and other democratic procedures.16 In a few cases, in-
ternational tension leading up to war may conceivably be identified as contrib-
uting to increased authoritarianism, as in Greece and Turkey in the 1960s. But 
most democracies are much more resilient. While peace may permit them to 
deepen their commitment to civil liberties and political rights, the threat of war 
will not lead to the abolition of democratic norms. 
Paradoxically, war may also be an effective midwife of peace. Although de-
mocracies rarely participate at the onset of new wars, they frequently join on-
going wars. And when they do go to war, they tend to be on the winning side 
(Lake, 1992; Reiter & Stam, 2002). In the two major wars of the twentieth cen-
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tury, World Wars I and II, the democracies were on the winning side. The same 
was the case in Korea, but not in Vietnam. In the four largest wars after the end 
of the Cold War (in terms of the number of participants and the size of the mili-
tary engagement, not in battle-deaths), the Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo War in 
1999, the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, and the Iraq 
War of 2003, the US and its allies quickly defeated the opponent militarily.17 In 
all of these wars, as in the two World Wars, a number of non-democratic coun-
tries also fought on the side of the Western democracies. 
Defeat in war frequently leads to regime change (Bueno de Mesquita & 
Siverson, 1995). In the case of surrender, the autocratic leader may be deposed 
by the victor, as happened to Hitler, Mullah Omar, and Saddam Hussein. But 
even if he survives the war itself, the defeated dictator has to face the conse-
quences of his actions at home. Though he does not answer to an electorate, he 
loses credibility as a national leader and support from whatever groups have 
propped up his regime, as happened to the Greek colonels following their ad-
venture in Cyprus in 1974, the Argentinean junta after their defeat in the Falk-
lands War in 1982, or Slobodan Milosevic after the Kosovo War. The resignation 
of an autocratic ruler increases the probability of a regime change. In the rarer 
cases where a democratic leader loses a war, the system provides for a peaceful 
change of leadership, and the probability of a regime change is less.18 The De-
mocratic and Republican administrations were defeated in elections following 
their losses in Vietnam in 1968 and 1975, but the US did not switch to a differ-
ent regime type. While defeat in war increases the probability of a regime 
change generally, this is particularly true for an autocratic state, and the net 
effect of many such changes is likely to shift the balance in the direction of de-
mocracy. 
An examination of the major waves of democracy in the twentieth century 
confirms this pattern. The defeat of autocracies in World War I (the German, 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
16 Great Britain put off parliamentary elections until the end of World War II, but he US con-
ducted a contested presidential election in 1944, as well as congressional elections. 
17 Following the military defeat of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq, internationalized civil wars continued in these countries. The eventual outcome of these 
wars remains undecided. 
18 Regime change can be operationalized as a change of a fixed number of points on the Polity 
score, but we use it here in the sense of a change from one of the broad categories of democracy, 







Hapsburg, and Ottoman empires) stimulated the growth of democracy in the 
later years of the first wave, just as the defeat of Nazi Germany, Japan, and 
their allies in World War II set off the second wave. The third wave of democracy 
does not coincide with the end of a hot war, but if we may interpret the end of 
the Cold War as a defeat for the Soviet Union in the ideological war with the 
West as well as in the arms race with the United States, leading to the collapse 
of the Soviet empire and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. 
The establishment (or reestablishment) of democracy in the wake of major 
wars, has seen a number of success stories (Italy, Germany, and Japan after 
World War II), as well as some clear failures (Russia after World War I, Eastern 
Europe after World War II), and some ambiguous cases (Germany after World 
War I). On the whole, however, there is enough evidence for the idea of war as 
the midwife of democracy that it is not surprising if decisionmakers in democ-
racies should begin to speculate if the world trend towards democracy might 
not be helped along by the judicious use of force. 
Such ideas are not new, particularly not in the United States. Hook (2002: 
109–110) argues that a ‘democratist crusade’ has been underway through the 
history of the US.19 Smith (1994: 5) traces its origins to the Spanish-American 
war of 1898 – a war that has been interpreted as a war between democracies 
(Ray, 1995), but which according to Peceny (1997) was seen at the time as a 
liberation of Cuba from the colonial yoke of an autocratic Spanish monarchy. 
Light (2001: 76) counts no less than 40 episodes between 1912 to 1932 where 
the US intervened in the Western hemisphere in order to promote democracy. 
Above all, the US entered World War I (‘the war to end all wars’), in President 
Wilson’s Kant-inspired words, ‘to make the world safe for democracy’. His Four-
teen Points advocated democratic government and national self-determination 
and the League of Nations set up in the wake of the war was meant to promote 
these goals. Another liberal democrat, President Roosevelt, brought the US into 
World War II for similar reasons. After the end of the war, again under US lead-
ership, the victorious powers set up an international organization, the United 
Nations, with a broad liberal agenda, while the US set out to democratize Ger-
many and Japan. When democracy in Western Europe seemed threatened by 
                                          
 
 







the rise of communism, the US intervened overtly and covertly to promote de-
mocratic alternatives. 
After the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, President George Bush 
proclaimed that ‘the day of the dictator is over’ and his successor Bill Clinton 
embraced the ‘enlargement of the democratic community’ as a key element of 
US foreign policy (Hook, 2002: 115). US military interventions (which had been 
frequent throughout the twentieth century) were increasingly justified in terms 
of democracy promotion. For instance, the UN-sanctioned intervention in Haïti 
in 1994 in support of the popularly elected President Aristide, deposed by the 
military, was called ‘Operation Uphold Democracy’. 
In any intervention carried out by a major power, it is difficult to distin-
guish between universalistic motivations like ‘promote democracy’ and self-
interested motivations like saving US citizens, protecting United Fruit, or ensur-
ing continued oil supplies.20 To some extent, the democratic peace blurs this 
distinction between universalism and self-interest. A leader of a democratic na-
tion may argue that an autocratic state presents a danger, whereas a democ-
racy would be able to live peacefully with other democratic states. Thus, the 
successful imposition of democracy is beneficial to national security. In a strong 
defense of democratic interventionism Bailey (2003: 2) goes so far as to argue 
that ‘the spread of liberal, free market democracy in the 20th century has been 
accomplished largely by force of arms’. 
But the promotion of democracy is not only part of US foreign policy. Dur-
ing the Cold War, spokesmen for the UN were generally limited to advocating 
‘good governance’, but in the post-Cold War world they more clearly espouse the 
goal of democracy.21 The European Union has been committed to democracy 
from its inception. NATO has increasingly come to require its members to re-
spect democratic procedures, while during the Cold War it was willing to toler-
ate authoritarian government in member states like Turkey and Portugal in 
defense against the greater enemy of communism. 
A number of NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty have come to 
play an important role in promoting human rights and, by implication, democ-
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ratic governance. Their advocacy has made clear the normative dilemma inher-
ent in the international system: On the one hand, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights outlines the inviolable rights of individual citizens. On the other 
hand, the Westphalian principles embodied in the UN Treaty ensure the invio-
lability of national sovereignty. But do nations have the right to use that sover-
eignty to violate international human rights? Increasingly, in the post-War 
World, the human rights movement began to answer this question in the nega-
tive, and this exercised a powerful influence on democratic governments and on 
international organizations. In a speech to the United Nations General Assem-
bly in 2000, Kofi Annan asked the crucial question: ‘... if humanitarian inter-
vention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights … ?’ A norm of humanitarian intervention began to emerge in in-
ternational law, expanding the just war of self-defense to a just war in defense 
of citizens of other countries whose rights were being grossly violated (Rosas, 
1994). A prominent democratic peace theorist, Rudolph Rummel (1994), has 
made the point that between four and five times as many people were killed by 
governments (in ‘democide’) in the twentieth century as were killed in war. 
While the figures for both forms of violence are highly uncertain, and Rummel’s 
democide figures may contain more indirect deaths from disease and starvation 
than are allowed into the war death figures, it seems probable that serious hu-
man rights violations have killed many more people than war during this pe-
riod. If early military intervention could have prevented these killings, would it 
have been justified? This point has been made in relation to the Holocaust, and 
more recently in relation to events in Bosnia and in several countries in Africa. 
Defenders of humanitarian intervention can also point to the declining number 
of battle-related casualties in war and the increasing use of precision targeting 
in military action. 
Critics of the democratic peace have long warned against such implica-
tions. Layne (1994: 14) argued that democratic peace theory could be used to 
legitimize an interventionist democratic crusade. Kegley & Hermann (2002: 19) 
have also pointed out how the logic of the democratic peace can encourage the 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
21 See e.g. Annan (2001). In this speech, the Secretary-General also embraced the idea of the de-







democracies’ ‘penchant for acting belligerently against autocratic governments, 
even to wage imperialistic wars against them. Flexing one’s muscle against a 
centralized policy is easily rationalized, and this rationale can become compel-
ling to democracies if the action might convert non-democracies to democratic 
rule and thus enlarge the zone of peace’. Among the supporters of the democ-
ratic peace, Russett (1993: 135–136) has argued that the ‘model of “fight them, 
beat them, and make them democratic” is irrevocably flawed as a basis for con-
temporary action’ (see also Russett & Oneal, 2001: 303). Russett (2005: 405) 
concedes that military interventions ‘have sometimes installed democracy by 
force, but they have more often failed, and the successes have been immensely 
expensive in lives and treasure’. 
A policy of democratization by force requires that decisionmakers in de-
mocracies are aware of the regularities described in this paper. If the peace-
building effects of democracy, the tendency of democracies to win wars, the 
democratizing effects on authoritarian countries of losing wars were known only 
to the research community and disbelieved among policymakers, democratic 
interventionism would be a tool waiting to be discovered. But there is no ques-
tion the democratic peace has penetrated the Western political establishment 
right to the top. James Baker, Secretary of State in the administration of George 
H. Bush, said in 1992 that ’real democracies do not go to war with one another’. 
President Clinton said in his State of the Union address in 1994 that ‘Democra-
cies don’t attack each other’. And as early as 1990, Margaret Thatcher said that 
‘democracies don’t go to war with one another’.22 The democratic peace seems to 
have become part of the conventional wisdom of the West over a decade ago. In 
the Clinton administration enlargement of the world community of democracies 
was placed at the core of US foreign policy. The introductory quote from Presi-
dent George W. Bush makes it clear that the link between the democratic peace 
and military intervention is accepted in the current administration. The victory 
of the democracies in the two world wars and in Korea have not gone unnoticed 
in the minds of democratic decisionmakers, and the US defeat in the Vietnam 
war is generally accounted for as a political defeat on the home front in an un-
popular war that the US should either not have entered or conducted with 
                                          
 
 







greater vigor. In the Cold War confrontation, victory for the democratic side 
could not be assured. But following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was 
no real military challenge to the self-confidence of the democracies. Apart from 
military strength, they could take heart from the Freedom House statistic that 
free countries control 89% of the world’s GDP, and could sustain either an arms 
race or a prolonged war against any opponent in sight. 
At least three recent wars can be interpreted in this perspective. The Kos-
ovo War in 1999 was undertaken against the authoritarian government of Ser-
bia with the stated purpose of preventing human rights violations in Kosovo. 
The outcome of the war is somewhat ambiguous as far as the long-term situa-
tion in Kosovo is concerned, but it was interpreted as an unqualified success in 
the sense that the Milosevic regime collapsed shortly after its defeat in the war. 
In 2001 the US (with support from the UN) unseated the Taliban regime in Af-
ghanistan in retaliation for its support for terrorism. In 2003 regime change 
again seems to have played a role in the decision to go war against Iraq, al-
though other issues (weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi support for terrorism) 
were touted more prominently in the hope of obtaining a better legal basis and 
greater international support for the intervention. In the public debate, the pos-
sibility of intervention to force regime change has also been discussed in rela-
tion to Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Such a strategy has not been suggested in 
the case of China. This could be interpreted as implying that the winds of inter-
nal change are sufficiently strong in China that a democratic transition will 
eventually happen without external intervention. But the reluctance to take on 
the world’s largest authoritarian country can also be interpreted in a democ-
ratic peace perspective: As Reiter & Stam (2002) argue, democracies tend to win 
the wars they participate in because they are better than autocracies at calcu-
lating their chances, and thus avoid taking on opponents that they cannot be 
sure to defeat. 
But can democratic interventionism be documented beyond reference to 
individual wars, where stated and unstated goals can easily be contested, par-
ticularly in the absence of declassified records of the decisionmaking? In the 
following we shall first summarize some existing research on this topic, before 
reporting results from our own empirical study. We focus on four main issues: 
Do democracies engage in frequent interventionary behavior? Do they target 
mainly authoritarian states? Do these interventions tend to promote democrati-







James Meernik (1996) investigated whether US interventions tended to 
promote democratization. Meernik collected data on 27 cases of US intervention 
involving the use of ground troops in the period 1948–90. Using Polity III as his 
measure of democracy, he measured political change for up to three years after 
the intervention. In most of the cases the outcome was ‘no change’, but when 
he compared the intervention cases with other international crises in which the 
US did not intervene with ground troops, he found ‘qualified evidence that US 
military intervention exercises a significant and positive effect on democratiza-
tion’ (Meernik, 1996: 397). He also found that when the US was truly commit-
ted to promoting democracy (as evidenced by presidential statements) it was 
generally quite successful (op.cit.: 400). Prior anti-US violence in the target 
country and prior US opposition to the regime were not significant in his study. 
Margaret Hermann & Charles Kegley in a series of articles have examined 
democracies’ use of military intervention. They find that democracies make fre-
quent use of military intervention. Somewhat more surprisingly, they also find 
that other democracies are targeted quite frequently. In one of their first studies 
(Kegley & Hermann, 1995b) they found 15 cases between 1974 and 1988 where 
free states (using the Freedom House classification) intervened in other free 
states. In this and in later publications, they characterize this as a possible 
‘danger zone in the democratic peace’. Using data for military intervention dur-
ing the period 1974–91 from Tillema (1991), Kegley & Hermann (1996: 314) 
found that roughly one fifth to one third of all interventions were initiated by 
democracies (depending on whether democracy was measured by Polity or 
Freedom House) and that a substantial share of them (19% when using Polity) 
was initiated by semi-democracies. This finding is somewhat confusing in rela-
tion to the idea of democratic interventionism. How can democratic states 
spread democracy by intervening in other democracies? Tures (2001) has 
largely cleared up this puzzle. He shows that the Kegley & Hermann studies 
used a Polity measure with annual dating of the polity changes. This may lead 
to erroneous conclusions with regard to the regime type of the target state at 
the time of the intervention, a problem which has plagued other studies of the 
democratic peace as well (Mitchell et al., 1998). Kegley & Hermann have also 
included interventions in democratic states where the intervener was asked by 
the local government to help it suppress a rebel movement, as well as interven-
tions into occupied states. Thus, the US and allied interventions to free Kuwait 







free’ state. Non-independent states (such as the Falkland Islands) are also 
coded as ‘partly free’. Dismissing such cases and using the Polity IIId data with 
more precise dating (Mitchell et al., 1998), Tures finds only 13 cases of democ-
racies intervening in other democracies over the longer time-span 1945–91. 
Four of these are interventions by Rhodesia and South Africa in Botswana. Be-
cause it relies only on institutional characteristics (and pays no attention to the 
level of participation) the Polity project codes South Africa under apartheid (and 
Rhodesia after its unilateral declaration of independence, when blacks were still 
denied the vote) as democracies. This startling classification makes little differ-
ence to most statistical studies, but exercises a strong influence on these re-
sults. The remaining five interventions are all in the two dyads India–Pakistan 
and Peru–Ecuador. Even including the interventions by Rhodesia and South 
Africa, Tures concludes – contrary to Kegley & Herman – that dyadic democratic 
interventions occur much less frequently than one would expect on the basis of 
the distribution of regime characteristics and the number of democratic inter-
ventions. The extensive targeting by democracies of other democracies appears 
to be a red herring. Pickering (1999) found that democracies with adequate mili-
tary strength were less frequent targets of military intervention generally in the 
period 1975–1996. 
But the fact remains that democracies frequently intervene militarily and 
Hermann & Kegley also investigated the motives and effects of these interven-
tions. Kegley & Hermann (1997a) showed that two-thirds of the democracies’ 
interventions were undertaken to expand or defend the liberal democratic 
community. Moreover, Hermann & Kegley (1998) showed that military interven-
tions undertaken in order to protect or promote democracy generally led to an 
increase in the level of democracy in the target states. In a study of 106 devel-
oping countries from 1960 to 2002, Pickering & Kisangani (2006) found that 
hostile interventions can help to democratize non-democratic targets. Pickering 
& Peceny (2006) found a strong statistical relationship between US hostile mili-
tary intervention and democratization, but this result seems to be driven by 
three cases in the Caribbean. Another note of skepticism is sounded by Bueno 
de Mesquita & Downs (2006), who argue that the citizens in a transformed de-
mocratic target are likely to have different policy priorities than those of the 
winning coalition in the intervening country. Empirically, they find for the pe-
riod 1946–2001 that intervention does little to promote democracy when com-







Mark Peceny (1999a,b) in an examination of a much longer time-series of 
US military interventions (1898–1992) concluded that military intervention in 
and of itself was not the decisive factor. Rather, it was active support for free 
and fair elections that had a positive impact on the democratization of target 
states. Peceny found support for elections to remain statistically significant 
when controlling for other factors like prior democratic experience, war partici-
pation of target states, and US opposition to the government of the target state. 
A weakness of most of these studies is the limited sample of interventions 
studied (small numbers in the case of Meernik and Hermann & Kegley; the lim-
ited focus on US interventions in the case of Meernik and Peceny), the weak 
coverage of the post-Cold War period (which has seen a strengthening of the 
ideology of democratic interventionism), and the limited number of control vari-
ables. The study of democratic change has not been situated within a more 
comprehensive theory of democratization. The interventions could have targeted 
countries where democratization was likely to happen in any case, because of 
internal factors or external factors not related to the intervention. We now turn 
to our own study, where we try to correct for these weaknesses. 
Research Design 
The concept of democratization covers a variety of regime changes, ranging from 
incremental changes from any initial level of democracy to dramatic transitions 
from full dictatorship to coherent democracy. To keep the analysis simple and 
tractable, we follow Gates et al. (2007) in defining a single measure of democra-
tization that covers all the possible changes, and use control variables to ac-
count for some of the diversity of transitions. This simplification allows us to 
use logit and probit models to test whether interventions tend to lead to democ-
ratization.  
The unit of analysis is the country-year. We considered the use of smaller 
time intervals (months or days), but most of the data were available only on an 
annual basis. The analysis covers the time period from 1960 to 1996 and the 
dataset includes all independent members of the international system as de-








Dependent Variable: Democratization 
There are various operational measures of democracy, most of them quite 
highly correlated with each other. We use Polity IV. Although it has its weak-
nesses – notably the subjective nature of the coding – its focus on institutional 
dimensions of democracy is conveniently situated somewhere between the 
minimalist conception of Vanhanen’s Polyarchy index (political competi-
tion*participation, see Vanhanen, 2000) and the maximalist conception of the 
Freedom House political freedom scale (Freedom House, annual). We use as our 
measure democracy the Polity variable (created by subtracting the autocracy 
score from the democracy score), which varies between –10 and +10. More pre-
cisely, we use the Polity2 score, where values for missing data, interregna, and 
transitions rather than coded as missing are scored either in the middle or pro-
rated over the interregnum. The interregnum periods could have been problem-
atic if they contained a large number of coups, but the Polity2 variable has only 
25 (0.49%) missing values, with just four countries experiencing an intervention 
during these years. 
Democratization is the dependent variable in the analysis and is defined 
(following Hegre et al., 2001: 36) as a positive change greater or equal to two 
points on the Polity2 variable from one year to the next. The variable is coded 1 
if such a change occurs, 0 otherwise. By definition, we cannot expect democra-
tization to occur for a country already at 9 or 10 on the Polity2 scale. In the 
analysis below of determinants of democratization we therefore leave out the 
24% of the country years where the country had attained 9 or 10 in the year 
prior to the observation. Of the remaining 3,856 country-years, 204 (5.3%) ex-
perience democratization. Figure 1 presents the distribution of countries with 
democratization from 1961 through 1996. We see several peaks in the distribu-
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Independent Variable: Intervention 
To measure intervention we considered several possible datasets, such as those 
used by Tillema (2000) or Regan (2000). Tillema’s Overt Military Intervention 
dataset is being updated, but so far is only available up to 1991. The Regan 
dataset covers the period up to 1999, but is limited to interventions in on-going 
civil wars. We therefore chose to use Jeffrey Pickering’s update of the Pearson & 
Baumann (1993–94) dataset on International Military Interventions (Pickering, 
1999, 2002). The original dataset spans the years 1946 to 1988, but was up-
dated by Pickering through 1996, using the original coding guidelines.23 The IMI 
dataset defines military intervention as ‘the use of troops or forces to cross bor-
ders or the employment of forces already based in a foreign country in pursuit 
of political or economic objectives in the context of a dispute’ (Pearson, 
Baumann & Pickering, 1994: 209). It includes friendly as well as hostile military 
interventions. Pickering’s updated dataset includes 827 individual military in-
terventions between 1946 and 1996, and 673 military interventions between 
                                          
 
 







1960 and 1996.24 Table I shows the most frequent intervening actors during 
this time period and Table II the most frequent targets of intervention. Most of 
the frequent interveners are indeed democracies, and most of the targets are 
non-democracies. 
The interventions were coded as democratic or autocratic. Following El-
lingsen (2000) and others, states receiving a score of 6 or higher on Polity2 are 
coded as democracies. A country-year with an intervention is coded as having a 
democratic military intervention if at least one of the intervening actors is coded 
as democratic. Other interventions are coded as autocratic. The Pickering data-
set codes not only states as intervening actors but also international organiza-
tions and multilateral forces. We define these as democratic if at least one 
country in the organization is a democracy. Appendix 4 shows how these actors 
have been coded. Among the organizations, only one (the Arab League) was 
coded as non-democratic. In addition, a non-independent country (Belize) was 
also coded as a non-democratic actor.25 
 










Computed from data in Pickering (1999). 
 
                                          
 
 
24 We have left out 23 military interventions listed by Pickering, since the targets of these inter-
ventions are not included in Polity for that year or at all. See Appendix 3 for a list of these inter-
ventions. 
25 Each military intervention has a unique case number with start and termination dates. If the 
termination date was missing, we have coded only the start year of the intervention as a country-
year with military intervention. Interventions with code 99999999 for termination date are ongo-
ing. Due to a misunderstanding we coded these as missing data. However, this has no effect on 
the results of the analyses because all these interventions start around 1991, and the subsequent 
year is coded as 1 on Recent intervention. The important factor is whether there has been a recent 
intervention, not whether an intervention is on-going. In two cases, the intervention started be-
fore 1991. These cases were modified and coded as ongoing military interventions through 1996. 
Included in the recent democratic intervention variable are also cases where the intervention 

















Computed from data in Pickering (1999). 
 
We have defined five sub-types of democratic interventions: democratic in-
terventions involving the US, interventions involving the UN, interventions oc-
curring after the end of the Cold War, and two variables denoting whether the 
interventions were in support of a democratic or an autocratic regime. 
There are two timing issues to consider: First, interventions may be initi-
ated as a result of institutional change. To avoid this potential endogeneity 
problem, we lag the intervention variables by one year. Second, the initiation of 
an intervention may not lead to an immediate democratization. Even so, institu-
tional changes that occur within a limited time-frame following the intervention 
may be attributed to the intervention. To allow for different post-intervention 
dynamics, we coded three different pairs of intervention variables: Recent de-
mocratic intervention and Recent autocratic intervention are used to study politi-
cal change that occurs within five years of the termination of an intervention. 
For each country-year we coded Recent democratic intervention as 1 if a democ-
ratic intervention had been initiated (or was still on-going) from one to five years 
earlier. A zero value on this variable includes cases where the country has never 
been the target of a democratic intervention as well as cases where the interven-
tion ended more than five years ago. The Recent autocratic intervention variable 
was coded in parallel fashion. 
The two variables Lagged democratic/autocratic intervention are more re-
strictively coded. Country-years are scored 1 on these variables only if the in-
tervention occurred in the previous year. For the third and most restrictive pair 
of variables, Lagged democratic intervention onset and Lagged autocratic inter-
vention onset, country-years are scored 1 only when the onset of an intervention 








We included a set of control variables to avoid bias due to omitted variables.26 
Most importantly, we include information on the democracy level of the country 
in the year before observation. As shown by Gurr (1974), Sanhueza (1999), and 
Gates et al. (2006), countries with intermediate levels of democracy are most 
likely to experience regime changes in any direction. As shown below, there is 
also a tendency for interventions to occur in these unstable regimes. To account 
for this, we include Polity2 lagged, the Polity2 level for the year before the year 
of observation, and Polity2 lagged squared to allow modeling a curvilinear rela-
tionship between the initial democracy level and the odds of democratization. 
There is potential autocorrelation between instances of (incremental) de-
mocratization. To account for this statistical dependence, a variable called Prox-
imity of democratization was included in the model. The variable is a decaying 
function of the number of years since the previous democratization in the coun-
try; prc=2(-years/2) where 2 is the half-life measured in years (see Hegre et al., 
2001).  
Modernization theory suggests that a high level of development is a pre-
requisite for democracy (Lipset; 1959). Economic indicators of development 
have two important shortcomings; they do not account for possible internal ine-
qualities and they do not capture non-economic aspects of development that 
influence peoples’ quality of life. Hence, we follow Urdal (2005: 424f.) in using 
as our measure of development the Infant Morality Rate (IMR) – the share of 
live-born children that die before the age of one year. GDP per capita and IMR 
are highly correlated, with a low value on IMR indicating a high level of devel-
opment. The IMR data were collected by Urdal from the World Population Pros-
pects (UN, 1999) and the Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual). The variable was 
log transformed in order to reduce its skewness. 
Social capital has been put forward as a condition for democratization 
(Putnam, 1993). We follow Paxton (2002) and Wiik (2002) in operationalizing 
social capital as the number of memberships in international non-governmental 
organizations. Ideally, we would have preferred to use data on memberships in 
                                          
 
 
26 Religion has also been found to influence democratization (Hadenius, 1992; Wiik, 2002). We 
originally included religion in our model, using data from The World Factbook (CIA, 2002) and 







national non-governmental organizations, but such data are not available on a 
cross-national basis. The data are estimated on the basis of data obtained from 
the Union of International Associations (UIA, annual; Wiik, 2002: 62). The vari-
able was log-transformed. 
Civil armed conflicts and international armed conflicts may have a nega-
tive relationship with democratization. We use the Uppsala Armed Conflict 
dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) to control for this. The variable Civil conflict (in-
cluding internationalized internal conflict) is a categorical variable with no con-
flict coded as 0, minor conflict coded as 1, and war coded as 2. The reference 
category for the variable is no conflict. The same procedure was applied for the 
International conflict variable. Both these variables were lagged by one year in 
the analyses. 
Finally, both the frequency and motivations for democratic interventions 
have probably changed after the end of the Cold War. Our Post-Cold war vari-
able was scored 1 in the years 1990–96 and 0 otherwise. 
Democratic Interventions? 
The first question we investigate is whether democracies engage in frequent in-
terventionary behavior. Figure 2 shows the trends in the incidence of military 
interventions – the share of the world’s countries in which a democratic or a 
non-democratic country or alliance was intervening. The most striking trend is 
the decrease in non-democratic interventions after the end of the Cold War. 
This decrease is to a large extent due to the changes in the Soviet Union: The 
USSR ended five interventions in 1988 and a sixth one in 1991. Apart from a 
peak in early 1990s, there is no such trend for democratic interventions since 
the 1970s – around 10% of the world’s countries have been targets of democ-
ratic interventions in the last 25 years of the data material. In the 1990s, more 
than two thirds of all interventions have involved democratic countries. In the 








Figure 2. Incidence of Military Interventions by Regime Type of Intervener, 
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The figure shows the percentage of all countries with an on-going democratic or autocratic inter-
vention in that year. 
 
Thus, there is indeed a great deal of democratic intervention, but there is 
no rising trend. Democratic interventions are now much more frequent than 
autocratic interventions, but this is mainly because of the sharp decline of 
autocratic interventions after the end of the Cold War. We have also compiled 
the onset of democratic and autocratic interventions (Figure 3). Here we do dis-
cern a long-term rising trend in the onset of democratic interventions that 
largely coincides with the third wave of democratization and a parallel decline in 
new autocratic interventions. However, the curve for the onset of democratic in-
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The figure shows the percentage of countries where a democratic or autocratic intervention starts 
in that year. These two series have been smoothed using a three-year moving average. 
 
Where Do The Interveners Intervene? 
Table III shows that semi-democracies have been targeted in 9% of all their 
country-years, clearly more frequently than autocracies (6.4%) and democracies 
(3.5%). This pattern is particularly marked for democratic interventions: Semi-
democracies are targets of democratic interventions in 5% of the relevant coun-
try-years, twice as often as for autocratic country-years. Autocratic interven-
tions are more likely to target autocracies (58% of 161 interventions) than 
democratic interventions are (45% of 130). Democratic interventions tend to 
target semi-democracies more often than autocratic interventions (36% vs. 
24%). 
This intervention pattern reflects the tendency for democratic interventions 
to occur in countries that are more likely to democratize, and demonstrates the 
importance of controlling for the initial democracy level when assessing the re-
lationship between intervention and subsequent likelihood of democratization: 







types of institutions, and hence are also most likely to democratize.27  At the 
same time, they are the most conflict-prone states. For a strategy of democratic 
interventionism it makes sense to target these states. 
 
Table III. Frequency of Intervention Onset By Regime Type of Target and 
Regime Type of Intervener, 1960–96 
  Type of intervention onset   
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Autocracy: Polity2<=–6. Semi-Democracy: –5<=Polity2<=5. Democracy: Polity2>=6 
 
Table III also shows that interventions generally, and democratic interven-
tions specifically, are rarely targeted against other democracies. Moreover, two 
thirds of these interventions are in support of the regime. Table IV lists the 
eight democratic interventions undertaken in opposition to a democratic re-
gime. All of them involve old rivals in the Third World and none of them involve 
the US or other major Western states that aim to use force to maintain or ex-
pand the global democratic community. 
 
Table IV. Democratic Interventions in Opposition to a Democratic Regime, 
1960–96 
Target   Onset of intervention  Actor 
Venezuela 1987  Colombia 
Ecuador 1984  Peru 
Peru 1981  Ecuador 
Greece 1986  Turkey 
Turkey 1986  Greece 
India 1996  Bangladesh 
Pakistan 1990  India 
 
Table V presents a more systematic analysis of where the democratic 
interveners intervene. Columns 2 and 3 present the results of a probit estima-
tion of the probability of the onset of an intervention involving democratic coun-
                                          
 
 







tries. Columns 4 and 5 present the result for a corresponding analysis for the 
onset of non-democratic interventions. 
The analysis replicates the results of Figure 3 and Table III: Democratic in-
terventions have become considerably more frequent after the end of the Cold 
War, and disproportionally occur in countries with political institutions that are 
coded as in the intermediate range of the Polity democracy index. These results 
are statistically significant. Autocratic interventions do not follow these pat-
terns. In addition, the analysis shows that both types of interventions dispro-
portionally occur in countries with low numbers of NGOs and in countries 
experiencing armed conflicts.28 
                                          
 
 
28 The NGO variable was designed to capture ‘social capital’. The variable is highly correlated with 
other measures of socio-economic development such as the Infant Mortality Rate and GDP per 









Table V. Probability of Onset of Intervention, Probit Estimation, 1961–96 




















































































N 4,844    4,844   
Log likelihood  –523.83    -666.66   
Pseudo-R2 0.080    0.028   
 
(*)  Significant at 0.10 level 
*  Significant at 0.05 level 
**  Significant at 0.01 level 
***   Significant at 0.001 level 
The model was estimated using robust standard errors. Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. 
 ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable 
Democratizing Interventions? 
Do democratic interventions tend to lead to democratization? Tables V and VI 
reports the results of the logistic regression analysis of the probability of a posi-
tive change in Polity2 from one year to another.29  
Table VI reports the results from probit analyses of the probability of de-
mocratization. Three models are presented, one for each of the three types of 
intervention variables. 
The model labeled ‘recent intervention’ indicates that there is a weak posi-
tive relationship between democratic interventions including the years immedi-
ately following them and democratization. The estimate for ‘democratic military 
                                          
 
 
29 Recall that the change in Polity2 has to be at least two units, and that countries with Polity2-








intervention’ is positive but significant only at the 0.10 level. The corresponding 
estimate in the model labeled ‘Lagged intervention’ is roughly similar: When 
only including the years during which the intervention is going on (lagged), the 
estimate is positive but only barely significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table VI. Probability of Democratization. Multivariate Models with Interven-

























































































































N  3,821   3,821   3,821   
Log likelihood  –723,25   –723,12   –722,40   
Pseudo-R2  0.092   0.092   0.093   
 
(*)  Significant at 0.10 level 
*  Significant at 0.05 level 
**  Significant at 0.01 level 
***   Significant at 0.001 level 
The model was estimated using robust standard errors. Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. 
 ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable 
The analysis includes only countries that scored 8 or lower on the Polity2 scale prior to the observation. 
 
 
The results indicate that democratization is significantly more likely in the 
year immediately following the initiation of a democratic intervention.30 In none 
                                          
 
 
30 Table VII shows that the different sub-types of democratic interventions all are positively re-
lated to democratization, but these estimates are not statistically significant. The democratizing 
effect of democratic interventions does not seem to be restricted to any of these sub-types. We 
also included Recent US Intervention and Recent UN Intervention in multivariate estimations as 







of the models do we find a relationship between autocratic interventions and 
subsequent democratizations. 
The table shows that the relationship between recent democratic interven-
tion and democratization hold when controlling for the possibly confounding 
factors. The results for the initial democracy level (Polity2 lagged and Polity2 
lagged squared) are consistent with previous research (Sanhueza, 1999; Hegre 
et al., 2001; Gates et al., 2006, 2007): Democratizations are most likely to occur 
in countries where the political institutions mix democratic and autocratic 
traits. Figure 4 shows the estimated probability of democratization as a function 
of the initial democracy level. Countries with a Polity2 score equal to –2 are 
most prone to experience democratization – this is estimated to happen in 12% 
of the years for the baseline case. In contrast, democratization is estimated to 
occur in less than 3% of the years for the most autocratic countries, and in less 
than 1% for the most democratic countries. 
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it is the democratic makeup of the intervening powers that matters, not whether the US partici-







The control variables perform largely as expected. The variable measuring 
social capital – the number of international NGOs in a country – is also signifi-
cant at the 0.01 level, and confirms the hypothesis that social capital increases 
the likelihood of democratization even when controlling for initial democracy 
level.31 The Post-Cold war variable is positive and significant in all three models. 
As clearly indicated in Figure 1, the post-Cold War years have seen a very high 
number of democratizations. The control for autocorrelation, Proximity of de-
mocratization, is positive as expected but only significant at the 0.10 level.  
A comparison of Tables V and VI shows that both democratic and auto-
cratic interventions tend to occur in situations where regime changes in general 
and democratizations in particular are especially likely: Both phenomena tend 
to happen in under-developed and semi-democratic countries, and both democ-
ratic interventions and democratizations became more frequent in the 1990s. 
This raises the question whether there is a ‘selection bias’: democratic interven-
tions tend to occur in countries where there is already a high probability of de-
mocratization.  
As a first cut to investigate this potential problem, we restrict the attention 
to the intervention country-years, including both autocratic and democratic in-
terventions. Among these, is democratization more likely in democratic inter-
ventions than in other interventions? 
To study this, we estimate the models in Table VI for this subset. We also 
estimated the models for this subset using a Heckman probit model with sam-
ple selection to account for the potential bias (see Greene, 1997: 974–981). The 
results of the Heckman probit model are presented in Table VII. The results for 
the ordinary probit model for the sub-sample are not reported, since they corre-
spond closely to the results in Table VII. Note that the results do not reject the 
null hypothesis that the two equations are uncorrelated – there is no selection 
bias in this model formulation. 
                                          
 
 
31 We found our measure of economic development, Infant mortality, not to be statistically signifi-
cant. The details of the analysis are not reported here. Our findings are consistent with earlier 
research (Przeworski et al., 2000; Gates et al., 2007). The relationship between democracy and 
development owes less to the influence of development on democratization than to the fact that 








Closely reflecting the results in Table VI, democratizations are more likely 
just after the onset of democratic interventions than just after the onset of 
autocratic interventions or at any other time during interventions. Also reflect-
ing the results in Table VI, this effect is restricted to the first year of the democ-







Table VII. Probability of Democratization in Intervention Cases. Accounting 
for Selection Bias, Heckman Probit Estimation, 1961–96 













































































Selection equation (incidence 
of all types of intervention) 
    






































































      
N  (total)  3,822   3,822  
Censored  observations  2,804   2,804  
Uncensored  observations  1,018   1,018  





LR test of independence of equa-
tions (ρ=0): 
Х2(1)=0.74;  
p-value = 0.39 
Х2(1)=0.53;  
p-value = 0.47 
Log likelihood  –2286.21   
 
(*)  Significant at 0.10 level 
*  Significant at 0.05 level 







***   Significant at 0.001 level 
Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. 
 ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable 
The analysis includes only countries that scored 8 or lower on the Polity2 scale prior to the observation. 
The analysis of the intervention cases yield slightly different results for the 
incidence of autocratic interventions variable, however. Democratizations are 
estimated to be less frequent during autocratic interventions than during de-
mocratic ones (and more frequent than the baseline, which is the last year of 
any intervention). 
Finally, we supplement the analysis in Table VI by also looking at how de-
mocratic and autocratic interventions affect autocratizations. Democratic inter-
ventions may be motivated by a desire to preserve democratic institutions just 
as much as promoting democratization. Hence, we would expect to observe a 
lower risk of autocratization following democratic interventions. Likewise, we 
would expect to see autocratizations to follow in the wake of autocratic inter-
ventions. 
Table VIII reports the results of the estimation of a multinomial logit model 
where the possible outcomes are democratization, autocratization, and no 
change. We only report the results for the pair of ‘lagged intervention onset’ 
variables. The corresponding results for the other versions of the intervention 








Table VIII. Probability of Democratization AND Autocratization by Recent 
Intervention Onset. Multinomial Logit Model, 1961–96 






















































































(*)  Significant at 0.10 level 
*  Significant at 0.05 level 
**  Significant at 0.01 level 
***   Significant at 0.001 level 
The model was estimated using robust standard errors. Significance levels refer to two-sided tests. 
 ‘ref. gr.’ is the reference category of the respective dummy variable 
The analysis includes only countries that scored 8 or lower on the Polity2 scale prior to the observation. 
The onset of democratic interventions is found to lead to subsequent de-
mocratizations just as in Table VI. We also find the onset of autocratic interven-
tions to be followed by a high probability of autocratizations. We do not find 
democratic interventions to reduce the risk of subsequent autocratization, how-
ever, nor do autocratic interventions reduce the risk of democratization. The es-
timate for democratic interventions in the autocratization equation as well as 
that for autocratic interventions in the democratization equation are not statis-
tically significant, and even have a positive sign. 
What Kind of Democratization Follows Democratic Intervention? 
The analysis reported in Table VI shows that democratic interventions tend to 
be followed by changes toward democratic institutions. However, democratiza-
tion was defined as a change of at least two units at the 21-point Polity2 scale. 
In addition to fairly marginal changes from any initial democracy level, these 







democracies, changes from semi-democracies to fully-fledged democracies, or 
changes that take the country all the way from dictatorship to democracy.  
 
Table IX. Regime Change Following Democratic Intervention, by Initial Re-
gime Type, 1961–96 
Regime type after intervention 










































Autocracy ranges from -10 to -6 on the Polity2 scale, Semi-democracy from –5 to +5, and Democ-
racy from +6 to +10. The table includes all country-years with a recent democratic intervention 
and that had a Polity2 code in the previous year. 
 
 
Table IX shows the distribution of the three regime types – autocracy, 
semi-democracy, and democracy – in the country-years with recent democratic 
interventions, broken down on the regime type of the previous year. Of the 428 
autocratic country-years that were followed by a democratic intervention, 21 
saw a change to semi-democracy, and only 4 a change to democracy. Thus, 
most of these democratizations were relatively incremental, only leading to the 
unstable semi-democratic type. Generally, as we would expect, we find more 
movement in the direction of greater democracy, 21 cases from autocracy to 
semi-democracy vs. 18 in the opposite direction, 11 cases from semi-democracy 
to democracy vs. 4 in the opposite directions, and 4 from autocracy to democ-
racy vs. 2 in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, of the 428 autocratic country-
years that were followed by a democratic intervention, 21 saw a change to semi-
democracy and only 4 to democracy. The overwhelming majority of semi-
democracies also stayed in this category, and there were more changes into au-
tocracy than into democracy. There is a net effect of greater democracy, but the 
democratic group is only marginally strengthened (260+9). 
 
Democratic Jihad? 
Democratic interventionism is, understandably, a deeply troubling ideology for 







to be free and fighting war to end war. In a sense, militant liberal intervention-
ism fits better into the value pattern of hardnosed realism. On the other hand, 
if we look at the potential consequences, it is also easy to see why democratic 
interventionism is a powerful and in many ways appealing ideology. Apart from 
its many other virtues, the continued spread of democracy is likely to reduce 
violence within and between nations. If a careful use of targeted violence 
against autocratic regimes could reduce genocide and politicide, decrease the 
risk of civil war, and promote international peace, it might be justified as a form 
of just war. This line of thinking appears to be gathering strength among West-
ern democracies, particularly in the US (Bailey, 2003). The European Union ap-
pears to have a higher threshold for prior provocation by the target state and a 
greater emphasis on approval for the intervention from the United Nations but 
does not reject humanitarian intervention in principle. 
The case for liberal interventionism has also been strengthened by the 
failure of many alternative strategies for ending internal violence, whether in 
the form of serious human rights violations or civil wars. Diplomatic initiatives 
generally fail against autocrats like Saddam Hussein, who succeed in shutting 
themselves off from international and domestic public opinion. And economic 
sanctions frequently cost more human lives than military interventions (Mueller 
& Mueller, 1999). 
In our empirical analysis we study the effect of democratic and autocratic 
military interventions regardless of the purpose of the intervention.  The argu-
ment is that a military intervention destabilizes the regime of the country where 
the intervention takes place, that a regime change is likely, and that if the in-
tervention is democratic the change is more likely to be in the direction of de-
mocracy. This is true even if the motive for the democratic intervention was to 
protect oil interests or the intervener’s citizens living there, to remove weapons 
of mass destruction or sources of support of terrorism, or whatever. The impor-
tant policy issue, however, is not whether such ‘inadvertent democratization’ 
will work, but whether military intervention can be used as a strategic tool by 
democratic states. 
The analysis shows that in the short run, democratic intervention does in-
deed promote democratization and that this relationship is robust to the control 
variables most frequently invoked in studies of democratization. However, the 
relationship is only apparent in the first year following the onset of an interven-







do not find any strong relationship. Moreover, over the period 1961–96 this de-
mocratization appears to have had relatively little effect in terms of moving 
countries up into the category of democracies on a tripartite division (democra-
cies, semi-democracies, autocracies). The greatest movement across categories 
is into semi-democracy (25 country-years), then into autocracy (20), and only 
then into democracy (15). Democracy is the only regime type that shows a net 
gain after a democratic intervention (+9, versus -5 for autocracy and -4 for 
semi-democracy), but the reason for this is that fewer democracies change re-
gime type following intervention. If the semi-democracies that move up into the 
democratic category become stable democracies, we could speak with more con-
fidence of a positive effect on peace. For this we would need to study the devel-
opment of these states over a longer time period. For the short term that we 
have studied, the most troublesome aspect is the movement into the semi-
democratic category, which is likely to be less peaceful and less stable. 
Two other problematic aspects of democratization after intervention are 
the regional environment of the new democracies and the economic structure of 
the country. Several empirical studies indicate that the prospects for democracy 
are worse for countries that are located in non-democratic neighborhoods 
(Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Gates et al., 2007), and that stable democracy is less 
likely in poor or oil-dependent countries (Carlsen & Hegre, 2007; Epstein et al., 
2006; Gates et al., 2006; Przeworski et al., 2000; Ross, 2001). Serbia, a middle-
income country located in an area of mostly democratic states, many of them 
well established democracies, seems a promising candidate for overcoming the 
rocky transition to democracy in a peaceful manner. Hence, although this paper 
has not modeled the regional context, our research gives us reason to believe 
that Afghanistan and Iraq are much less hopeful from this perspective.32 
The same is true for other potential targets like Iran, Libya, and Syria. The 
idea of remaking the Middle East into a haven of democracy may be laudable, 
but a piecemeal strategy does not seem to have much chance of success. Invad-
ing all of the autocratic countries in the region over a short period does not 
seem very realistic either. It would rob the West of most of its allies in the re-
gion and would inevitably lead to an imperial overstretch. 
                                          
 
 







In the public debate, there are also other arguments against a strategy of 
democratic interventionism. Some libertarians, although favorable to democracy 
and not necessarily averse for the use of force, argue that forced democratiza-
tion inflates the state and threatens liberty at home (Preble, 2003). Radicals will 
be more concerned with the conflating of the spread of democracy with the 
spread of Western economic interests, and the fear of retaliation from targeted 
autocratic groups (radical islamists in particular). The bombings in Madrid and 
London strengthen these fears. Such counterarguments may not be powerful 
enough to halt the trend towards increased interventionism. Another quagmire 







Appendix 1. Democratic Interventions 
 
No. Target  Year  Interveners  Democratic interveners 
 
The Americas 
40 Cuba  1960 USA  USA 
41 Haiti  1963 USA  USA 
    1993–95  UN (1993), USA (1994–95), Multi-
nat’l Force for Haïti (1994–95) 
UN, USA, Multinational 
Force for Haïti 
42 Dom.  Republic  1961 USA  USA 
    1965–66  USA, OAS  USA, OAS 
90 Guatemala  1987 USA  USA 
   1989–92  UN  UN 
91  Honduras  1969–80  OAS, El Salvador (1969–71, 1976), 
Nicaragua (1980) 
OAS 
    1986–92  USA (1986–88), Nicaragua (1986–
88), UN (1989–92) 
USA, UN 
 




OAS (1969–80,) Honduras (1969–
71, 1976)  
Honduras (1982–83), USA (1983–
88), UN (1989–95) 
OAS  
 
Honduras, USA, UN 
93 Nicaragua  1979 USA  USA 
    1984  Costa Rica  Costa Rica 
   1989–92  UN  UN 
94  Costa Rica  1978–79  Ven., Panama, Nicaragua, USA 
(1979) 
Venezuela, USA 
   1989–92  UN  UN 
95 Panama  1988–90  USA  USA 
100 Colombia  1995  Venezuela  Venezuela 
101 Venezuela  1987  Colombia  Colombia 
110 Guyana  1970  Venezuela  Venezuela 
   1978  USA  USA 
130 Ecuador  1984  Peru  Peru 
135 Peru  1981  Ecuador  Ecuador 
   1995  Ecuador  Ecuador 
145 Bolivia  1979  USA  USA 
   1986  USA  USA 
 
Europe 
205 Ireland  1985  UK  UK 
210 Netherlands  1962  Indonesia,  UN  UN 
235 Portugal  1961  India  India 
310 Hungary  1993  EU  EU 
325 Italy  1985  USA  USA 
343 Macedonia  1995  UN  UN 
344 Croatia  1992  Yugoslavia,  UN  UN 
   1996  UN  UN 
345 Yugoslavia  1991  EU  EU 
346 Bosnia–
Herzegovina 
1992–96  Yugoslavia (1992–95), EU (1992), 
NATO (1994–95), Croatia (1992–95), 
UN 
UN, NATO, EU 
350 Greece  1986  Turkey  Turkey 
352  Cyprus  1963–88  UK (1963–64, 1974), Turkey (1963–
68, 1974–88) Greece (1963–68, 
1974), UN (1964–88), USA (1974), 
Egypt (1978) 
UK, USA, Turkey, UN 
355 Bulgaria  1992  EU  EU 
359 Moldova  1992  Russia  Russia 
372  Georgia  1992–93  Russia, UN (1993)  Russia, UN 









420 Gambia  1981  Senegal,  US  US 
433 Senegal  1969  Portugal,  France  France 
434 Benin  1991  France  France 
435  Mauritania  1977–80  France, Morocco (1977–79)  France 
450  Liberia  1990–96  ECOMOG, USA (1990–91), Sierra 
Leone (1991), UN (1993) 
USA, ECOMOG, UN 
471 Cameroun  1994  France    France 
481 Gabon  1964  France,  USA  USA 
   1990  France  France 
482  Central Afr. Rep.  1979–81  France, Zaire (1979)  France 
    1996  France, USA  France, USA 
483  Chad  1969–75  France, Libya (1973–75)  France 
    1977–84  France (1977–80, 1983–84), Libya, 
Nigeria (1979, 1983), OAU (1980–
82), Zaire (1983–84), USA (1983) 
France, OAU, USA 
   1986–87  France,  Libya  France 
   1990–92  France  France 
   1994  UN  UN 
490  Zaire  1960–65  Belgium (1960–61, 1964), UN 
(1960–64), USA (1960–61, 1964–
65), Uganda (1965), UK (1964), Por-
tugal (1964) 
Belgium, UN, USA, U-
ganda, UK 
   1967  Ethiopia,  USA  USA 
    1977–79  Morocco, France (1977–78), Sene-
gal, Uganda (1977), Egypt (1977), 
Belgium (1978–79), USA (1978–79), 
UK (1978), Gabon (1978–79), Togo 
(1978) 
France, Belgium, USA, 
UK 
    1991  France, Belgium  France, Belgium 
    1993–94  France, USA (1994)  France, USA 
500  Uganda  1964–68  UK (1964), Zaire (1965), Sudan 
(1965–68) 
UK, Sudan 
   1976  Israel  Israel 
    1991–94  UN (1993–94), OAU (1991–93)  UN, OAU 
501 Kenya  1964–73  UK  UK 
   1982  UK  UK 
510  Tanzania  1964  UK, OAU  UK, OAU 
   1994  USA  USA 
516 Burundi  1994–96  OAU  OAU 
517 Rwanda  1967  USA  USA 
517  Rwanda  1990–96  France (1990, 1993–94), Zaire 
(1990, 1996), Belgium (1990), OAU 
(1991–93), UN (1993–96), USA 
(1994, 1996), Canada (1996) 
France, Belgium, UN, 
OAU, USA, Canada 
520 Somalia  1976  France  France 
   1992–95  UN  UN 
522 Djibouti  1992  France  France 
540  Angola  1989–96  UN, S. Africa (1989), Namibia 
(1995) 
UN, Namibia 
541 Mozambique 1992–95  UN  UN 
551  Zambia  1965–66  UK, Portugal (1966)  UK 
560 South  Africa  1979–82  Botswana  Botswana 
571 Botswana  1992  Namibia  Namibia 
581 Comoros  1989  France  France 
   1995  France  France 
590 Mauritius  1968  UK  UK 
600 Morocco  1963–64  OAU,  Algeria  OAU 
   1976–78  France  France 
   1991  UN  UN 
615 Algeria  1963–64  OAU,  Morocco  OAU 
620 Libya  1986  USA  USA 
   1994  UN  UN 









630 Iran  1980  Iraq,  USA  USA 
   1988  Iraq,  UN  UN 
   1994  Turkey  Turkey 
     1996  Turkey  Turkey 
640 Turkey  1986  Greece  Greece 
645 Iraq  1967  Israel  Israel 
   1981  Iran,  Israel  Israel 
    1983–88  Turkey (1983–87), Iran, UN (1988)  Turkey, UN 
    1991–93  Turkey, UN (1991), Persian Gulf 
War Coalition Forces (1991), Opera-
tion Provide Comfort (1991), Iran 
(1992–93), Operation Southern 
Watch (1992), Post Gulf War Coali-
tion Forces (1993)  
Turkey, UN, Persian 
Gulf War Coalition 
Forces, Operation Pro-
vide Comfort, Operation 
Southern Watch, Post 
Gulf War Coalition 
Forces  
   1996  Iran,  USA  USA 
651  Egypt  1960–88  UN, Israel (1960, 1967, 1969–70, 
1973–74), Russia (1967, 1970–72), 
Sudan (1967–73), Algeria (1967, 
1973), Libya (1973, 1977), Kuwait 
(1973), North Korea (1973), Morocco 
(1973), Iraq (1973), Tunisia (1973), 
Multinational Force and Observers 
in Sinai (1982–88), France (1984), 
UK (1984), USA (1984)  
Israel, UN, Sudan, Mul-
tinational Force and 
Observers in Sinai, 
France, UK, USA 
652  Syria  1960–88  Israel (1962, 1964–67, 1970, 1972–
74), UN, Egypt (1960–61), Iraq 
(1969–70, 1973), Jordan (1971, 
1973), Russia (1973, 1983–88), 
Morocco (1973), Kuwait (1973), 
Saudi Arabia (1973–76)  
Israel, UN 
660  Lebanon  1960–88  Israel (1965, 1969–88), UN, Syria 
(1963, 1973, 1976–88), Libya 
(1972–82), Arab League (1976–82), 
USA (1976, 1982–84), France 
(1982–84), UK (1982–84), Italy 
(1982–84) 
Israel, USA, UK, France, 
Italy 
663  Jordan  1960–88  UN, Israel (1960–70, 1972–88), 
Saudi Arabia (1967), Iraq (1967–
70), Pakistan (1970), Syria (1970–
71), Arab League (1970–71) 
Israel, UN 
666  Israel  1960–88  UN, Egypt (1960, 1967, 1969–70, 
1973–74), Syria (1962, 1964–67, 
1970, 1973–74), Jordan (1963, 
1967–68), Iraq (1967–68) 
UN 
670  Saudi Arabia  1963–64  UN, USA (1963), Syria, Jordan, 
Egypt 
UN, USA 
   1984  Pakistan,  USA  USA 
   1988  Pakistan  Pakistan 
    1990–91  Persian Gulf War Coalition Forces  Persian Gulf War CF 
678  North Yemen  1963–66  Egypt, UN (1963–64), UK  UN, UK 
690  Kuwait  1991  Iraq, UN, Persian Gulf War CF  UN, Persian Gulf War 
CF 
    1993–94  Iraq (1993), USA (1993), Post Gulf 
War Coalition Forces (1994) 
USA, Post Gulf War CF 
   1996  USA  USA 
696  United Arab Em.  1988  Pakistan  Pakistan 
698  Oman  1966–77  UK, Russia (1973), Iran (1973–77), 











   1993  CIS  CIS 
   1995  CIS  CIS 
702 Tajikistan  1992  CIS  CIS 
   1994  UN  UN 
710 China  1962  India  India 
    1965–69  India, Russia (1969)  India 
731 North  Korea  1960–84  UN  UN 
750  India  1960–88  UN, China (1962, 1965–69, 1975), 
USA (1962), Pakistan (1965–66, 
1971–72, 1981), Bangladesh (1979, 
1981–85) 
UN, USA 
   1996  Bangladesh  Bangladesh 
770  Pakistan  1960–88  UN, India (1965–66, 1971–72, 
1981, 1984–87), UK (1971), Af-
ghanistan (1979–80, 1983–88), 
Russia (1980–88) 
India, UN, UK 
   1990  India  India 
   1996  India  India 
771 Bangladesh  1975–76  India  India 
    1991–93  India, Burma (1991, 1993)  India 
775 Burma  1995  Thailand  Thailand 
780 Sri  Lanka  1987–88  India  India 
800  Thailand  1962  Australia, New Zealand, UK, USA  Australia, NZ, UK, USA 
    1966–76  USA, Malaysia (1969–76), Laos 
(1975–76), Cambodia (1976) 
USA 
811  Cambodia  1964–73  North Vietnam, USA, South Viet-
nam (1970–73)  
USA 
     1975  USA, North Vietnam  USA 
   1991–93  UN  UN 
812 Laos  1961–62  USA  USA 
    1964–73  USA, North Vietnam, South Viet-
nam (1966–73), Thailand (1965–73) 
USA 
816  North Vietnam  1964–75  USA, China (1964–71), South Viet-
nam (1964–65), Cambodia (1975) 
USA 
817  South Vietnam  1961–73  USA, North Vietnam (1964–73), 
Australia (1965–72), New Zealand 
(1965–72), Thailand (1966–72), the 
Republic of Korea (1966–73), Phil-
ippines (1966–70) 
USA, Australia, New 
Zealand 
820  Malaysia  1960–66  Indonesia (1963–66), Common-
wealth, Singapore (1965–66) 
Commonwealth 
840 Philippines  1989  USA  USA 
850 Indonesia  1966–68  Malaysia  Malaysia 
910 Papua  New 
Guinea 
1994  South Pacific Peacekeeping Force in 
Papua New Guinea 
South Pacific Peace-








Appendix 2. Non-Democratic Interventions 
 
No. Target  Year  Interveners 
 
Americas 
40 Cuba  1962 Russia 
   1978  Russia 
70 Mexico  1982–83  Guatemala 
90 Guatemala  1995 Belize 
91  Honduras  1981–82  El Salvador, Nicaragua (1981) 
   1984–85  Nicaragua 
93 Nicaragua  1980–81  Honduras 
   1985–88  Honduras 
94 Costa  Rica  1983–85  Nicaragua 
101 Venezuela  1967  Cuba 
130 Ecuador  1995  Peru 
135 Peru  1978  Ecuador 
145 Bolivia  1967  Cuba 
155 Chile  1982  Argentina 
 
Europe 
200  UK  1963–65  Indonesia (1963), Egypt (1963–64), North Yemen 
   1971  Iran 
   1976  Argentina 
   1979–80  South  Africa 
   1982  Argentina 
210 Netherlands  1961  Indonesia 
230  Spain  1975–76  Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria (1976) 
235 Portugal  1967–76  China  (1967),  S. Africa(1968–75), Senegal (1972), 
Indonesia (1975–76),Cuba (1975), Zaire (1975) 
260 West  Germany  1985  Czechoslovakia 
265 East  Germany  1961  Russia 
315 Czechoslovakia  1968–69  Russia,  Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany 
325 Italy  1986  Libya 
344 Croatia  1993–95  Yugoslavia 
365 Russia  1969  China 
372 Georgia  1994  Russia 
373 Azerbaijan  1993  Iran 
 
Africa 
404 Guinea–Bissau  1990  Senegal 
   1992  Senegal 
411 Equatorial  Guinea  1969  Spain 
   1972  Gabon 
   1979  Morocco 
420 Gambia  1971  Senegal 
   1974  Senegal 
   1980  Senegal 
   1982–88  Senegal 
432 Mali  1985  Burkina  Faso 
433 Senegal  1961–68  Portugal 
   1970–73  Portugal 
   1989–90  Mauritania,  Guinea–Bissau (1990) 
434 Benin  1977  Guinea 
435 Mauritania  1981  Morocco 
   1989–90  Senegal 
436 Niger  1993  Chad 
437  Ivory Coast   1966  France, Guinea 
438 Guinea  1970  Portugal 







   1985  Mali 
450 Liberia  1979  Guinea 
451 Sierra  Leone  1971–73  Guinea 
   1991  Guinea,  Nigeria 
471 Cameroon  1960  France 
   1993  Nigeria 
475 Nigeria  1967–70  Egypt 
481 Gabon  1965  France 
482  Central African Republic  1967  France 
483 Chad  1960–65  France 
   1968  France 
   1976  Libya 
   1985  Libya 
   1988  Libya 
484 Congo  1963  France 
490 Zaire  1976  Cuba 
   1996  Uganda,  Rwanda 
500  Uganda  1969–72  Sudan (1969–71), Tanzania (1971), Libya (1972) 
    1978–81  Tanzania, Libya (1979) 
   1996  Zaire 
501 Kenya  1976  Uganda 
    1987–89  Uganda (1987–88), Somalia (1989) 
510 Tanzania  1966–67  Portugal 
    1971–73  Uganda (1971–72), Port. (1972–73), Burundi (1973) 
    1978–79  Uganda (1978), Mozambique, Libya (1979) 
516  Burundi  1972–73  Zaire (1972), Tanzania (1973) 
520 Somalia  1964  Ethiopia 
   1977–78  Ethiopia 
   1982–85  Ethiopia 
530 Ethiopia  1964  Somalia 
    1977–84  Somalia (1977–78), Cuba, South Yemen (1977–78, 
Russia (1977–79) 
540  Angola  1975–88  Zaire (1975–76), Cuba (1975–88), Russia (1975–88), 
South Africa, Guinea (1975–76) 
541 Mozambique  1976–79  Tanzania,  Zimbabwe 
    1981–89  S. Africa (1981, 1983–85, 1987, 1989), Zimbabwe 
(1982–88), Tanzania (1987–88), Malawi (1987–88) 
551 Zambia  1967–72  Portugal 
    1976–82  South Africa, Zimbabwe (1977–80), Zaire (1982) 
   1986–87  South  Africa 
552  Zimbabwe  1976–79  South Africa, Mozambique (1976), Zambia (1977) 
   1982  South  Africa 
   1985–86  South  Africa 
565 Namibia  1990  Angola 
570 Lesotho  1982  South  Africa 
571  Botswana  1975–88  Zimbabwe (1975–80, 1983), South Africa (1981–88)  
572 Swaziland  1985–86  South  Africa 
600 Morocco  1960–62  France 
615 Algeria  1984  Morocco 
616 Tunisia  1961–62  France 
620 Libya  1977  Pakistan,  Egypt 
625  Sudan  1970–72  Russia (1970–71), Egypt 
   1986  Libya 
   1989  Chad 
   1995  Egypt 
 
Middle East 
630 Iran  1966  Iraq 
   1972–74  Iraq 
   1979  Iraq 
   1981–87  Iraq 
640 Turkey  1962  Iraq 
   1965  Iraq 







645 Iraq  1963  Syria 
   1969  Iran 
    1972–75  Iran (1972–74), Russia (1973–75) 
   1980  Iran 
   1982  Iran 
   1994  Iran 
666 Israel  1991  Iraq 
670 Saudi  Arabia  1962  Egypt 
   1965–67  Jordan,  Egypt 
   1969–70  South  Yemen 
   1981–83  Pakistan 
   1985–87  Pakistan 
   1994–95  Yemen 
678 North  Yemen  1962  Egypt 
    1967–70  Russia (1967–68), Egypt (1967), Syria (1968), South 
Yemen (1968–70) 
    1972  South Yemen, Arab League 
    1979–80  South Yemen (1979), Saudi Arabia (1980) 
679  Yemen  1994–96  Saudi Arabia (1994–95), Eritrea (1995–96)  
680  South Yemen  1969–70  Saudi Arabia 
    1972–76  Oman (1972–75), North Yemen (1972), Arab League 
(1972), Cuba (1976) 
   1979  North  Yemen 
   1984  Russia 
690 Kuwait  1963  Arab  League 
   1973  Saudi  Arabia 
   1975–77  Iraq 
   1980–88  Iran 
   1990  Iraq 
692 Bahrain  1986  Qatar 
694 Qatar  1992  Saudi  Arabia 
696  United Arab Emirates  1977–87  Pakistan 
   1992  Iran 
698 Oman  1978–79  Iran 
   1981–82  South  Yemen 
 
Asia 
700 Afghanistan  1979–87  Russia 
   1990–91  Russia 
710 China  1960–61  Taiwan 
   1963–64  Taiwan 
    1970–79  Taiwan, South Vietnam (1974) 
   1981  Vietnam 
   1984–85  Vietnam 
   1987  Vietnam 
712 Mongolia  1966–88  Russia 
713  Taiwan  1960–78  China, South Vietnam (1974) 
732  The Republic of Korea  1992  North Korea 
770 Pakistan  1989  Afghanistan 
   1991  Afghanistan   
   1994  Afghanistan 
771 Bangladesh  1994  Burma 
775 Burma  1969–74  China 
790 Nepal  1960–61  China 
800  Thailand  1977–88  Malaysia (1977–80), Laos (1977–78, 1980–82, 
1985–88), Cambodia (1977–78, 1980), North Viet-
nam (1980–87), Indonesia (1981) 
   1992–93  Burma 
811 Cambodia  1960–63  South  Vietnam 
   1974  North  Vietnam 
    1976–88  North Vietnam, Thailand (1977–78, 1982), Laos 
(1979) 
812 Laos  1960  North  Vietnam 







    1974–88  N. Vietnam, Thailand (1974–78, 1980–82, 1984–88) 
817  South Vietnam  1974–75  North Vietnam 
818  Vietnam  1976–79  Cambodia (1976–78), China (1979) 
   1981  China 
    1984–88  China, Malaysia (1984) 
820  Malaysia  1967–81  Indonesia (1967–76), Thailand (1969–81) 
840 Philippines  1974  South  Vietnam 








Appendix 3. Military Interventions Not Included in the Analysis 
 
No.   Year   Target   Interveners    
31   1980   Bahamas USA,  Cuba 
  1985     USA 
 
55   1983   Grenada   USA,  West  Indies  Associated  States 
 
60   1969   St.  Christopher  UK     
 
338   1985   Malta   Egypt 
 
511   1964   Zanzibar   USA,  UK   
 
565   1989   Namibia   UN    
 
690    1961–62   Kuwait    Arab League, UK (1961), Saudi Arabia (1961) 
 
781   1988   Maldives   India   
 
835   1962–63   Brunei   UK   
1984–88     UK 
 
935    1980    Vanuatu   Australia, Papua New Guinea, UK, France 
 
940    1992–93   Solomon Island  Papua New Guinea 










Appendix 4. Regime Type Coding of Intervening States and Organiza-
tions Not Included in Polity IV 
 
No. Country  or  organization 
1 UN,  democracy 
5 NATO,  democracy 
6 EU,  democracy 
10  Persian Gulf War Coalition Forces, democracy 
11  Post Gulf War Coalition Forces, democracy. 
US, UK, France, and six Gulf states provided troops/ships during 10/94–12/94 crises.  
12  Operation Provide Comfort MNF Forces, democracy. US, UK, France, and Turkey. 
13  Operation Southern Watch MNF Forces, democracy. US, UK, and France 
16 Multinational  Force  for Haiti, democracy 
29  OAS, democracy  
80 Belize,  non-democracy 
204 Commonwealth,  democracy 
366 CIS,  democracy 
429 OAU,  democracy 
430  ECOWAS (ECOMOG action in Liberia), democracy 
619  Arab League, non-democracy 
653  Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, democracy 
911  South Pacific Peacekeeping Force in Papua New Guinea, democracy 
 








Appendix 5. Abbreviations 
 
OAS    Organization  of  American  States   
OAU    Organization  of  African  Unity 
CIS    Commonwealth  of  Independent  States 
ECOWAS (ECOMOG)  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
UK    United  Kingdom   
NATO    North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
USA      United States of America 








Appendix 6. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  N Mean  St.dev.  Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Democratization 4,880  0.043  0.202 0 1 
Intervention variable 
Recent intervention  5,070  0.363  0.481  0  1 
Recent dem. intervention  5,070  0.201  0.401  0  1 
Recent autocr. intervention  5,070  0.220  0.414  0  1 
Recent US intervention  5,070  0.059  0.236  0  1 
Recent UN intervention  5,070  0.  0.  0  1 
Recent cold-war dem. int.  5,070  0.171  0.377  0  1 
Recent dem. intervention 
supporting a dem. regime 
5,070 0.029  0.169  0  1 
Recent dem. intervention 
supporting an aut. regime 
5,070 0.035  0.183  0  1 
Control variables 
Non-governmental org.  5,016  463.610  526.143 0  3255 
Infant mortality  5,039  3.987  0.954 1.386  5.572 
Previous democratization  5,070  9.457  10.703 0  36 
Polity2, lagged  4,882  -1.023  7.523 -10  10 
Polity2, lagged, squared  4,882  57.629  30.736 0  100 
Christians 5,016  0.535  0.499 0  1 
Orthodox 5,016  0.052  0.223 0  1 
Muslims 5,016  0.296  0.457 0  1 
Buddhists 5,016  0.096  0.294 0  1 
Hindus 5,016  0.021  0.142 0  1 
Internat’l conflict, lagged 

















Civil conflict, lagged 
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